Yet Medicaid provides incomplete consumption smoothing for most individuals. Medicaid’s crowd-out effect stems from the large implicit tax (about 60-75 percent for a median-wealth individual) that Medicaid imposes on private insurance. The major implication is that the equilibrium size of the system is too large if votes are fully aware of the consequences of the policy. And countries with SHI already in place are making vigorous efforts to extend coverage to the informal sector. The authors examine the effect of deposit insurance on the size and volatility of the financial sector in a sample of 58 countries. Do deposit insurance programs contribute to financial development? We begin by providing an overview of the auto insurance system and the structure of the auto insurance market. By providing a synopsis and evaluation of existing empirical research on the development of insurance markets, this article provides a discussion of the factors that promote insurance market development. We then turn to an analysis of the factors underlying the auto insurance price increases experienced in recent years.

Recent research by Horowitz and Lichtenberg indicated that, contrary to conventional wisdom, farmers that purchased insurance tended to use relatively more chemical inputs than farmers who did not insure. The new rule is to be applied on new cars that are purchased on or after September 1, 2018. The date of registration of these vehicles will be considered at the time of buying third party insurance. Implications for the joint determination of insurance and input use decisions and appropriate estimation techniques are discussed. This paper develops a majority voting model to analyze the determination of taxes and transfers in a system of pay‐as‐yougo social insurance. The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. But in sound regulatory environments, deposit insurance does have the desired impact on financial development and growth. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders.

There is no persuasive evidence that increasing profit rates or expense loadings contributed to inflation in premiums. Preliminary empirical evidence presented shows that the “systematic risk” of underwriting profits approaches zero in most lines. Starting with an aggregated model and generalizing results reported recently in the literature about “proper” underwriting profit, the paper turns to disaggregation of the model with m insurance lines. This paper examines how crop insurance affects corn farmers’ fertilizer and pesticide use in the U.S. U.S. crop insurer portfolios are twenty to fifty times riskier than they would be otherwise if yields were stochastically independent across farms. Ironically, this revival is occurring at a time when the traditional SHI countries in Europe have either already reduced payroll financing in favor of general revenues, or are in the process of doing so. Many countries that have in the past relied largely on tax finance (and out‐of‐pocket payments) have introduced SHI, or are thinking about doing so. In many contexts, idiosyncratic risks are high, so credit/insurance arrangements could be beneficial.

Without affordable reinsurance, private crop insurance markets are doomed to fail because systemic weather effects induce high correlation among farm-level yields, defeating insurer efforts to pool risks across farms. It is shown how only a subset of the basic results of the single-risk model is robust enough to extend to models with multiple risks. Our data basis covers 84 life and 243 non-life companies for the period 1984-1989. The main findings show a high correlation between parametric and nonparametric results and a wide dispersion in the rates of inefficiency across companies. The penultimate section discusses the empirical results. The remaining parts of this paper are structured as follows: the following section discusses the data used in the empirical analysis and the econometric methodology. The concluding portion of the article discusses the limitations of a GR policy in the health and environmental liability area, the most serious being instability in estimates of underlying loss trends. We propose a guaranteed renewability (GR) insurance in which a sequence of premiums would enable insurers to break even and would be chosen by both low- and high-risk buyers, whether or not they had suffered a loss. However, you may want to contact your chosen provider before purchasing the policy to see if they’re able to accept any NCB from a company car.